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WINDFALL JUSTICE: SENTENCES AT THE MERCY OF
HYPERTECHNICALITY
Jack Nordby†
Once upon a time (a time not so remote as to be beyond the
memories of many of us who still toil in the vineyards of justice),
the severity of a criminal sentence was determined largely at the
whim of the trial judge, who was guided only by vague
considerations of suitability. Non-premeditated murder, for
example, might be punished by anything from probation to forty
1
years in prison. A parole board exercised a similarly subjective
2
power to temper the term with early release. Then, about a
quarter century ago, the legislature created a commission to
establish sentencing “guidelines,” said to be “advisory,” to assist trial
judges in devising sentences that would provide greater uniformity
3
than had emerged under the earlier system. This resulted in
classification of offenses according to severity which, crossreferenced to the defendant’s criminal record, yielded a
4
“presumptive” sentence.
Now, in the case of the murderer
mentioned above, instead of a range of zero to forty years, the
5
The range of the judge’s
scope would be 299–313 months.
discretion, in other words, was abruptly pruned from forty years to
fourteen months.
Although described as “advisory,” the guidelines rather quickly
became more nearly mandatory.
Any deviation from the
prescribed sentence must be justified as a “departure” under an
incredibly complex and evolving set of often vague rules found in

† Judge, Hennepin County District Court; L.L.B., 1967, Harvard Law
School; B.A., 1964, Harvard College.
1. MINN. STAT. § 609.19 (2002).
2. See MINN. STAT. § 243.12, repealed by 1983 Minn. Laws 274.
3. See MINN. STAT. § 244.09 (2002).
4. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
AND COMMENTARY 19-23 (revised Aug. 1, 2004), available at http://www.msgc.state.
mn.us/Guidelines/guide04.DOC.
5. Id. at 49. This assumes defendant has a clear prior record. Id.
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6

the guidelines themselves (as interpreted, refined, and confused
by innumerable appellate opinions).
Well-intended systems of governance (especially those
designed to be flexible) have an apparently irresistible tendency to
evolve into mechanisms of unforgiving rigidity. The “advisory”
guidelines became “presumptive.” The “presumptive” guidelines
became all but mandatory. The bases for departure matured from
helpful suggestions to indispensable elements to be proved,
pronounced, and entered on the record at a precisely appointed
time.
The apotheosis (or nadir) of this formulaic and ossifying
7
pedantry was reached recently in State v. Geller.
Mr. Geller
committed a burglary and fled from police in a high-speed chase,
8
throwing marijuana and guns from the car before crashing it. He
9
pled guilty. The judge announced he was considering an upward
10
At
departure and solicited memoranda on the matter.
sentencing, he imposed an upward departure, but neglected to
11
state the reasons for it on the record.
The court of appeals
remanded to provide an opportunity to remedy this omission
12
under Williams v. State, where the necessity of stating grounds to
13
justify a departure had been emphasized.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in turn reversed, holding that
14
there is no remedy for such an oversight. The opinion provides
neither legal authority nor persuasive reasons why so draconian a
result should flow from a judge’s momentary lapse, or why a simple
remand is not the obvious way to correct it. The opinion is a pure
exercise of power, a flexing of minatory judicial muscle, so to
15
speak, to “warn district courts.” The court takes no account of:
(1) the unfairness to prosecutors of reducing sentences judges have
6. Id. at 24-31.
7. 665 N.W.2d 514 (Minn. 2003).
8. Id. at 515.
9. Id. at 515-16.
10. Id. at 516.
11. Id.
12. 361 N.W.2d 840, 844 (Minn. 1985). A number of court of appeals
opinions had in similar circumstances simply and sensibly remanded. See State v.
McAdory, 543 N.W.2d 692, 698 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Garrett, 479
N.W.2d 745, 749 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Sundstrom, 474 N.W.2d 213, 216
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991); State v. Pieri, 461 N.W.2d 398, 401 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
13. Williams, 361 N.W.2d at 843-44.
14. Geller, 665 N.W.2d at 517.
15. Id.
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found justified; (2) more importantly perhaps, the unfairness to
victims, whose violators may receive extraordinary windfalls in the
form of early release; (3) the unfairness to the sentencing judge,
whose moment of forgetfulness is elevated humiliatingly and
16
unnecessarily to an irremediable defect; or (4) the damage to the
integrity and perception of the justice system itself, whose
aspirations toward carefully considered sentences tailored to the
myriad interests of particular cases are thus defeated. And—it
bears repeating—no constitutional provision, no statute, no rule,
no precedent required this outcome.
Thus can the tail come to wag the dog.
But any degree of certainty the Geller court might have thought
it was injecting into sentencing must now be viewed in light of
17
Blakely v. Washington. In Blakely, the United States Supreme Court
effectively rendered Geller obsolete by holding that juries, not judges
(no matter how punctually articulate about their reasons), must
18
find the facts justifying departures.
The opinion extended
19
Apprendi v. New Jersey, which had required jury findings of any facts
used to raise a sentence beyond the prescribed maximum, by
20
holding that guideline sentences are such maximums. Thus, for those
constitutional purposes, the maximum intentional murder
sentence in Minnesota is not the forty-year outside figure of the
statute, but the 299–313 months in the guidelines.
It is surely ironic, and not altogether a bad thing, that just as
the guideline system was reaching a point of atrophy in some
respects, hyper-complexity in others, and petrifaction in at least the
Geller example, it should in effect be disemboweled by a single bolt
from on high. For Blakely presages a revolution in sentencing; it is
the epitaph to the guidelines system as we know it. Decisions such
as this from time to time provide salutarily humbling experiences
for courts (or should do so). Rarely has an opinion made nonsense
16. Within a few days of reading the Geller opinion and writing a commentary
on it, I presided at a sentencing where I imposed a departure and forgot to state
the reasons. I have done the same thing two or three times since. Although this
may be attributable to shortcomings unique to myself, I doubt it.
17. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
18. Id. at 2538-39. Unless the defendant waives the right to jury trial on the
allegations supporting a departure, and either stipulates to them or submits them
to the judge for decision, they must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to the
jury. The decision rests on the federal constitutional right to jury trial and thus is
binding on the states.
19. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
20. Id. at 490.
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(or at any rate greatly diminished sense) out of so many appellate
opinions, trial court orders, statutes, commentaries, and other
earnest and confident judicial pronouncements. For it tells us we
have failed for so long to understand an important aspect of so
familiar, rudimentary, and essential a thing as the right to trial by
jury.
One hopes that in starting anew, as we must, we may rescue
from the twenty-five year experiment what is valuable and
21
constitutional, and eliminate what is not.

21. The options appear to be these: (1) Jury findings of departure factors, but
this would result in a great deal of highly damaging evidence, otherwise
inadmissible, coming into the trial; (2) Bifurcated trials, with the departure
evidence heard by the jury at the second or sentencing phase; (3) Bifurcated trials
with a jury waived for the sentencing phase, which would then be heard only the
judge; (4) Stipulations by defendants to the departure factors, eliminating the
need for evidence; (5) Legislation providing precise sentences for all crimes; or
(6) A return to discretionary sentencing within broad limits. It is likely the third
and fourth options will, for practical reasons, be used in a majority of cases until a
new system is devised.
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